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Syria: Power Sharing as an 
Alternative to Regional Conflagration
Stephan Rosiny
On 21 August 2013, an estimated 1,400 people died in a poison gas attack in the suburbs 
of the Syrian capital Damascus. As a result, the United States and its allies were faced 
with the decision of whether to use direct military intervention in Syria, 30 months after 
the outbreak of the uprising and two years after it had escalated into bloody civil war. 
Analysis
An external military strike against the Syrian regime would have permanently shifted 
the complex nexus of local, regional and international actors and interests in Syria. 
Such an action would have been unlikely to resolve the conflict, but would have quite 
possibly exacerbated it.
  In the third year of the uprising in Syria, there is no sign of a solution. Neither the 
regime nor the broad spectrum of opposition forces appears capable of winning 
this destructive power struggle. There are strong indications that there will (almost) 
only be losers in the end.
  There are numerous external actors involved in the Syrian conflict who financially, 
diplomatically and militarily support either the regime or the various opposition 
camps. This is what saw the initial insurrection turn into a civil war; and the civil war, 
into a proxy war. Today, Syria is center stage of the struggle for the reconfiguration 
of the Middle East after the Arab Spring.
  An alternative to military intervention would be to exert political pressure on the 
participants to resolve their conflict through nonmilitary means and to develop a 
negotiated power-sharing arrangement.
  The accession of Syria to the Chemical Weapons Convention on 14 October 2013 has 
presented an opportunity for further negotiated solutions by bringing the previously 
isolated Bashar al-Assad regime back to the international negotiating table. Now, 
regional and international actors must push both the regime and the opposition to 
engage in serious talks. Achieving this in the context of Geneva II  negotiations (for 
which have been scheduled for 22 January 2014) may be unrealistic considering the 
extensive preconditions of both sides. Without a negotiated compromise, however, 
the most likely outcome will be regional conflagration.
Keywords: Syria, post-Arab Spring, civil war, proxy war, Geneva II
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Syria in the Context of the Arab Spring
By early November 2013, there were an estimat-
ed 120,000 deaths – of which more than 40,000 
were civilians. Two million refugees, including 
more than one million children and young people, 
have fled to neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, 
Egypt and Iraq. In addition, there are over four 
million internally displaced persons. Thus, almost 
one-third of the total population of 22.5 million 
has had to flee their homes. Moreover, 1.2 mil-
lion residences have been destroyed.1 How did 
the Syrian war reach this incredible level of vio-
lence and destruction? What effect would an in-
ternational military strike have had, and what op-
tions are there to stop the fighting?
The uprising in Syria can only be understood 
in the context of the Arab Spring, which has been 
disrupting the existing system of authoritarian 
rule in the Middle East since December 2010. With 
the ousting of the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders 
in January 2011 and February 2011, respectively, 
and the massive protest movement demanding 
the overthrow of the autocratic rulers in Bahrain, 
Yemen and Libya, regimes appeared to be falling 
like dominoes.
Syria was initially an exception. And although 
the call for a “day of rage” on 4 February 2011 
through the social networks of Twitter and Face-
book proved popular (achieving 12,000 “likes” on 
the latter), noteworthy demonstrations – unlike in 
most Arab countries – remained absent in Syria in 
early 2011. Two contrasting explanations can be 
found for this. First, Bashar al-Assad still enjoyed 
relatively high popularity compared to other Ar-
ab despots because he took a clear stand against 
unpopular US policies in the Middle East and the 
Israeli occupation of Arab territory. Along with 
Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon (and the Palestin-
ian Hamas until 2011), Syria belongs to the “axis 
of resistance,” whose leaders had high approval 
ratings in the Middle East up until 2010. Second, 
Bashar’s father, Hafez al-Assad, brutally quelled 
an armed revolt in Hama in February 1982, which 
resulted in a high degree of reluctance to carry out 
protests.
In mid-March 2011, the first major protest ral-
lies also occurred in Syria. As feared, the regime 
reacted with heavy-handed force, which – as had 
1 Current refugee numbers can be found at: <http://data.unhcr.
org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>.
already been seen in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and 
Libya – had the opposite effect of what was intend-
ed: it continually created new “martyrs,” whose 
funerals were used as occasions for renewed pro-
tests and repression. The government crackdown 
alienated the population and drove more people 
to side with the insurgents; young people (chil-
dren, in fact, in the Syrian case) protested along-
side their parents, extended family and neighbors, 
as well as other residents in their villages and dis-
tricts.
For a long time, the protests were restricted 
to peripheral areas such as Dar`a and cities like 
Homs and Hama (Leenders 2012). The opposition 
in Syria is deeply divided into ideological and po-
litical schools of thought as well as ethnic/confes-
sional groups that greatly differ in their methods, 
allies and goals. The only thing they have in com-
mon is their call for the overthrow of Bashar al-
Assad. Unsurprisingly, there are a multitude of 
visions for the post-Assad period, including liber-
al-democratic, nationalist and socialist designs, as 
well as various plans for radical Islamic rule and 
separatist projects.
However, Assad can still rely on the support 
of a significant part of society and the state appa-
ratus. Unlike in Tunisia and Egypt, the army and 
the security apparatus have remained on the side 
of the ruler – even though desertions have been 
a particularly frequent occurrence since mid-
2011. The ardent supporters of the “Arab social-
ist” Baath ideology and the “axis of resistance” 
see the insurrection as an attempt by the Unit-
ed States and Israel to divide Syrian society and 
to break resistance against the “US-Zionist proj-
ect” in the region. Beneficiaries of the regime, to 
which some sections of the Sunni bourgeoisie be-
long, are worried about the privileges with which 
they are rewarded in Syria’s dirigiste economy for 
their loyalty. Members of religious and ethnic mi-
norities in particular are fearful that a rebel victo-
ry would lead to a rise in radical Islam and Sunni 
Arab chauvinism.
Sectarianism and Regionalization
Syrian society exhibits a particular ethnic/confes-
sional diversity. In addition to the Sunni Arab ma-
jority (60–65 percent), there are Alawite Shia (12 
percent), followers of various Christian church-
es (10 percent), Kurds (10–15 percent), Druze (3 
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percent), Twelver Shia (2 percent), Ismailis, Yazi-
dis, and many other small ethnic and confessional 
communities. In the state and security apparatus, 
members of the Alawite community are overrep-
resented, whereas the revolt is mainly support-
ed by Sunni Arabs. This reinforces sectarian en-
emy stereotypes and emanates a pattern of con-
flict in the region. Syria is closely linked to Leb-
anon, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Turkey and 
the Gulf monarchies through ethnic/confessional, 
kinship and political ties, as well as through labor 
migrants and refugees. Members of ethnic/confes-
sional communities, tribespeople, and support-
ers of Islamist ideologues across the borders are 
providing money, weapons and fighters to “their” 
brethren. The events in Syria are inversely affect-
ing neighboring countries, where the differences 
between Sunnis and Shiites, Arabs and Kurds, and 
Islamists and secularists mark partly identical po-
litical poles.
A key factor in this development is that those 
residents identify primarily with their own “com-
munity of fate” (usually an ethnic, a kinship or a 
confessional community, or an exclusivist politi-
cal ideology like ethnic nationalism and Islamism) 
and much less so with the common nation-state. 
They form strong sub- and trans-national “we 
groups.” Such groups offer their members iden-
tity and protection in times of crisis, while inter-
preting criticism and attacks from outside as (of-
ten existentially) threatening. Even followers of 
various ideological schools of socialism, national-
ism and Islamism frequently treat each other as 
essentialist enemies and regard themselves as the 
sole legitimate representatives of their groups.
These identity communities are relevant in the 
Middle East since both states and societies are 
comparatively underdeveloped. They lack for-
mal structures that treat inhabitants, irrespective 
of their origin and religious beliefs, as equal citi-
zens and that integrate them into a reliable frame-
work of rules and institutions. Many regimes in 
the Middle East perform functions of the modern 
state – such as security, justice and conflict media-
tion, education, social services and the regulation 
of the markets – in only a rudimentary manner. 
State security forces are more an instrument of 
control than of ensuring the public’s safety, while 
the judiciary is obedient to the regime and inac-
cessible to many residents. State charitable aid is 
dependent on the good behavior of the receiver. 
The political and economic elite is composed of 
only a few families.
People gain access to opportunities, resourc-
es and information not so much through govern-
ment institutions, open-to-all civil society orga-
nizations and critical media, but rather through 
closed networks in their respective “we-groups”. 
Tribes, clans, and religious communities, as well 
as ruling parties such as the Syrian Baath Party, 
act as collectives that seek power and that pro-
duce and promote their own respective “truth.” 
In this context, the state is the “prey” and not a 
counterbalance within society. In the Syrian up-
rising, these structures clearly manifested them-
selves and contributed to the violent escalation. 
Thus in a worst-case scenario, the civil war in Syr-
ia could be the precursor to a new regional crisis. 
Evidence of this can be found in the overthrow of 
the Egyptian government in early July 2013 and 
its violent repercussions; the fragile state-building 
processes in Libya, Tunisia and Yemen; continued 
unrest in Bahrain; the threats of civil war in Leba-
non and Iraq; and the domestic political crises in 
many other countries in the region, such as in Al-
geria and Turkey.
The course of the Arab Spring reflects the am-
bivalence of this situation. On the one hand, the 
majority of people are disappointed and angry 
about the unjust, corrupt and degrading access 
to resources and opportunities under authoritari-
an regimes. “Bread, freedom and dignity” was the 
main slogan of the protesters. On the other hand, 
they interpret the causes of the structural prob-
lems as the personal failure of a ruler, as the col-
lective discrimination of their own community or 
as the moral misconduct of other faiths. As soon 
as the corrupt leaders are overthrown, the own 
group enjoys more privileges and the “true” doc-
trine is in power, they expect an immediate im-
provement in their condition. The current devel-
opments in Egypt show how quickly this can lead 
to disappointment and renewed regime change.
From Peaceful Protest to Civil War and Proxy 
War in Syria
With a few exceptions, the protests against the 
Bashar al-Assad regime remained peaceful dur-
ing the first half-year. From the very beginning, 
however, the regime used disproportionate force 
against civilians in the hope of nipping initially lo-
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calized protests in the bud and deterring further 
unrest elsewhere. The protests witnessed their 
first peak in summer 2011, when some members 
of the security forces refused the order to fire and 
deserted. They and other volunteers came togeth-
er to form the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which be-
gan an armed rebellion. Despite increased repres-
sion through the use of tanks, artillery, combat 
aircraft, missiles and chemical weapons, the re-
gime enjoyed less and less success in quashing the 
erupting armed uprisings in various parts of the 
country. This power shift was due in large part 
to the battle-hardened foreign militias, radical Is-
lamic jihadists in particular, who had been inter-
vening against the regime since the beginning of 
2012 and increasingly providing the uprising with 
a religious character (International Crisis Group 
2012). They have an estimated 6,000–15,000 fight-
ers – though they themselves claim to be 30,000 
strong.2 These militias come from various Middle 
Eastern countries, Turkey, Afghanistan, the Cau-
casus and Southeast Asia, while about one-tenth 
(600–1,000) come from Europe. For these rebels, 
Syria is currently the center of their global “ho-
ly war,” in which they are fighting against “un-
Islamic” regimes, “renegade Shiites,” “the West” 
and more generally against everything and every-
one that contradicts their ideologically narrow, 
militant, radicalized ideas of Islam.
Since mid-2012, fighting between opposition 
militias has been increasing – above all, between 
members of the FSA, jihadists and Kurdish mili-
tias. Syria has been divided into a patchwork in 
which various armed groups and warlords con-
trol their own territories and have established 
their own quasi-governmental regimes. In mid-
2013, there were an estimated 1,200 armed groups. 
They quickly recruit new members, whom they 
could potentially lose to other groups that are 
more efficient, better equipped and better remu-
nerated. This is how “moderate” rebel groups of 
the FSA lost fighters to jihadist networks like Al-
Qaeda’s Nusra Front. Since claiming autonomy in 
the summer of 2013, northeastern Kurdish associ-
ations have been attacked by FSA and Nusra Front 
groups. The regime – which consists mainly of 
Alawites – has also contributed to sectarianization 
by using the Alawite militia Shabiha (“ghost”) to 
carry out its brutal counterinsurgency dirty work. 
2 Syria’s Western Jihadists, in: The Daily Beast, 4.8.2013, 
<www.thedailybeast.com/witw/articles/2013/08/04/western-
jihadists-head-to-syria-to-fight.html>.
The conflict has long since met the criteria of a 
civil war. Through the extensive participation of 
foreign actors, it has escalated more and more in-
to a proxy war:
 − between Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey 
over regional hegemony;
 − between Sunnis and Shiites over denomination-
al dominance;
 − within the Sunni camp between Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Egypt under Mursi over the 
role as the leading “Sunni” power;
 − between different schools of Sunni Islam over 
religious interpretational sovereignty;
 − between Israel and Iran over Israel’s and Pales-
tine’s “right to exist” and over Iran’s (and Isra-
el’s) nuclear program;
 − between Arabs, Kurds, Turks and Persians over 
cultural privileges;
 − and between the United States and Russia (the 
two world powers) and the United Kingdom 
and France over regional and global influence.
In Syria, these actors are struggling for the fun-
damental reorganization of the Middle East af-
ter the Arab Spring. The Syrian regime is sup-
ported by Russia, China and Iran, as well as the 
non-state Lebanese Hezbollah. Active on the reb-
el side are Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United 
States, France, the United Kingdom, Jordan and 
Libya (and also Egypt until Mursi’s fall). In addi-
tion, there are foreign private financiers and Sun-
ni, Shiite and Kurdish parties supporting differ-
ent political factions in Syria with weapons and 
militiamen. Israel intervened directly in the fight-
ing, launching several air strikes against suspect-
ed government military installations and weap-
ons convoys on their way to Lebanon.
Conversely, the conflicts are more frequently 
encroaching on neighboring countries. Syrian ref-
ugees, for instance, bring with them their traumat-
ic experiences and their view of things. They rein-
force political differences and ethnic/confessional 
resentment in the host countries. Foreign fighters 
return to their home countries with extremist po-
litical and religious enemy stereotypes and expe-
rience in guerrilla warfare, which militarizes po-
litical controversy. In Lebanon and Iraq, members 
of similar ethnic/confessional communities con-
front each other as in Syria. Both countries have 
already witnessed bombings and armed violence, 
which are associated with the Syrian civil war.
Both the regime and the rebels still seem deter-
mined to decide the conflict militarily. Both sides 
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are still too strong to be defeated, but too weak 
to secure victory. Each time one side receives re-
inforcements from its supporters, the other side 
is also upgraded as its allies follow suit. Further-
more, a “win solution” of one side over the oth-
er would only lead to further ethnic/confession-
al polarization in the region. For example, a Sun-
ni-rebel victory would prompt Sunnis to encour-
age power corrections in other countries like Iraq 
and Lebanon; a victory for the “Shiite Alawite” re-
gime, however, would strengthen anti-Shiite re-
sentment in the region.
The Use of Chemical Weapons as a Turning 
Point
The civil war and the proxy wars would have pre-
sumably continued unabated had the use of poi-
son gas in the suburbs of Damascus not occurred 
on 21 August 2013. This act led the US presi-
dent, Barak Obama, to declare that a “red line” 
had been crossed, while several Western leaders 
proclaimed their determination to launch a mili-
tary strike against the Syrian regime. Such action 
was probably prevented by a rhetorical “mistake” 
made by the US secretary of state, John Kerry, 
during a press conference on 9 September 2013. 
In responding to a question, he claimed that only 
Syria’s complete surrender of chemical weapons 
to the international community would prevent a 
military strike – a solution he himself did not ex-
pect. However, probably due to Russian pressure, 
the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, an-
nounced on the same day that Syria was prepared 
to comply with the proposal. On 14 September 
2013, Syria declared its readiness to join the UN 
Chemical Weapons Convention, and on 21 Sep-
tember 2013 – as required – it submitted a list of 
warehouses and production facilities for chemical 
weapons to the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). On 27 September 
2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2118 con-
firmed the demands on Syria to chemically dis-
arm, and OPCW inspectors began to oversee the 
destruction of chemical weapons and their pro-
duction facilities in October.
A War with Nothing but Losers
External military intervention, even executed “sur-
gically,” would not have reduced the suffering of 
the civilian population; rather, it would have pro-
longed the war, complicated the supervision of 
chemical weapons, impaired negotiations on a po-
litical settlement and encouraged a regional esca-
lation of violence. Even territorially dividing Syr-
ia into small states to protect ethnic minorities – 
as has been put forward as a possible solution – 
would lead to new minority problems, if not inter-
nal ethnic cleansing and long-lasting border con-
flicts between the new units. It would also bring 
into question the territorial integrity of neighbor-
ing states whose minorities might feel encouraged 
to claim autonomy rights. The Syrian uprising has 
already intensified the Kurdish autonomy move-
ment. The area inhabited by Kurds in northern 
Syria is now being referred to as “West Kurdis-
tan” and maintains privileged relations with the 
autonomous Kurdistan region in Iraq – something 
that could encourage Turkish Kurds to join this ir-
redentist alliance.
The continued fighting and even a rebel victo-
ry could prove to be something of a boomerang 
for the supporting countries. The ideological rad-
icalization of political Salafism into militant jihad-
ism threatens even the conservative Gulf monar-
chies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, which have pro-
moted Salafism for decades. This is because the re-
ligious enemy of jihadism includes not only the 
“apostate” Shiites and the Western “crusaders” 
but also the “corrupt” Gulf monarchies. A “stage 
win” in Syria will inspire the jihadists to fight for 
(as they understand it) the “victory of Islam” in 
other countries such as Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, 
as well as Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
Consequently, the continuing war in Syria is 
having a negative impact on neighboring coun-
tries. An overspill of ethnic/sectarian tensions 
threatens Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan (In-
ternational Crisis Group 2013). Many Turks are 
unhappy with the unilateral positioning of their 
government in the Syria conflict, as reflected in the 
protests and riots against the Islamist AKP gov-
ernment. Other supporters of the rebellion fear 
a strengthening of Islamism. For instance, Egyp-
tians backed the military’s decision to depose 
President Mursi on 3 July 2013 following his call 
for jihad on 15 June 2013 to join the rebels against 
the Syrian regime.
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The Syrian regime’s external supporters, no-
tably Russia and Iran, also face setbacks irrespec-
tive of whether the regime is victorious or defeat-
ed. Russia is interested in the preservation of the 
regime for geostrategic, military and econom-
ic reasons. Should the regime fall, Russia would 
be faced with a fundamental change in the Syr-
ian alliance policy given that Putin is seen to be 
a close ally of Assad. Following the military re-
gime changes in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003 
and Libya in 2011, Syria would be the latest case 
of a Middle Eastern country reorganizing its gov-
ernment structure without Russia’s input – some-
thing that would constitute a severe loss of influ-
ence for Moscow. Furthermore, numerous arms 
deals, a stake in Syria’s oil and gas production and 
Russia’s naval base in the port of Tartus would all 
be under threat, as would be the repayment of 
substantial debts. Nevertheless, Russia’s interests 
extend far beyond the economic; this is evidenced 
by Putin turning down a deal allegedly offered by 
Saudi prince Bandar bin Sultan that included a 15 
billion USD weapons deal and a hedge for Rus-
sian gas supplies to Europe in exchange for Mos-
cow reducing its support for the Syrian regime.3 
However, such a “deal” would have undeniably 
cast doubt on Russia’s credibility as a political 
partner.
The traumatic defeat in the war in Afghan-
istan in 1989 – which the Islamists at that time 
celebrated as a “victory over communism” – the 
war in the North Caucasus and the attacks by Is-
lamist terror groups in Moscow explain Russia’s 
fear of a strengthening and expansion of jihadism 
should the Syrian rebels come out on top. None-
theless, Moscow’s unconditional support of the 
Assad regime could backfire given that the brutal-
ity employed by the Syrian regime to fight the in-
surgents will only radicalize further. As a conse-
quence, jihadists could increasingly come to view 
Russia as its main opponent instead of the Unit-
ed States.
Iran’s motives, as well as the limits of its sup-
port of the Syrian regime, lie elsewhere. In Teh-
ran’s case, strategic reasons (Syria is the bridge-
head to Iran’s Lebanese and Palestinian partners) 
play a role alongside moral and religious reasons. 
During the First Gulf War (1980–1988), Syria was 
Iran’s only Arab partner. Now, Tehran wants to 
3 Saudi offers Russia deal to scale back Assad support – sources, 
in: Reuters, 7.8.2013, <www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/
us-syria-crisis-saudi-russia-idUSBRE9760OQ20130807>.
reciprocate by assisting its ally in difficult times. 
The Shiite “Islamic Republic of Iran” also consid-
ers itself, despite its pan-Islamic rhetoric, to be re-
sponsible for the protection of Shiites. In Syria, 
there are various Shiite shrines that have become 
the targets of attacks. Radical Sunnis see Shiites as 
apostatized “idolaters” – a belief from which they 
derive a legitimacy to kill Shiites. For that reason, 
Iran trains and equips Shiite militias that are de-
ployed to Syria to support the regime and protect 
Shiite shrines and residential areas.
Yet, Iran’s commitment is in danger of bring-
ing about the opposite of what was intended. The 
country has seen itself as a protector of the “de-
prived” since the “Islamic Revolution” and has 
recognized the sequel to its own revolution in the 
uprisings of the Arab Spring. Its support, howev-
er, for the violent crackdown on the Syrian rebel-
lion has undermined this revolutionary image. Al-
so, the escalation of sectarianism in the Syrian civ-
il war has seriously harmed Iran and its Shiite al-
lies because most of the victims of the sectarian 
war in the region are Shiites, who only account for 
a minority. Meanwhile, Hezbollah has lost a sig-
nificant amount of respect in Lebanon due to its 
military engagements on behalf of the Syrian re-
gime. Sunni radicals have threatened revenge at-
tacks, and bomb attacks on Shiite targets on 15 Au-
gust and 19 November 2013 in southern Beirut re-
sulted in the deaths of 22 and 30 people, respec-
tively.
Power Sharing as an Alternative
It is high time for the blocking attitude of the re-
gime and the opposition, as well as both sides’ 
supporters, to be put aside and for a negotiated 
political solution to be sought. The key to bring-
ing Assad to the negotiating table and getting him 
to make concessions lies with Russia and espe-
cially Iran, which alone could exert the necessary 
pressure on him. There are signs that the Unit-
ed States is prepared to recognize Iran’s role in a 
possible solution. Russia and Iran should make it 
clear to the Assad regime that for them there is al-
so a “red line” and that they are no longer pre-
pared to offer unconditional support. Both coun-
tries have shown a keen interest in resolving the 
Syrian conflict politically. They will, however, on-
ly put pressure on the Syrian regime if their inter-
ests are taken into account. Conversely, they will 
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demand that the opposition’s Western and Mid-
dle Eastern partners urge the rebels to also engage 
in a negotiated solution without making Assad’s 
renunciation of power a precondition. Moreover, 
Turkey and the Arab Gulf states of Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar should deprive the jihadists of any sup-
port, such as weapons, money and safe passage.
The complex web of actors and interests in 
Syria resemble the skill game Mikado: move one 
stick too vigorously, and it can have far-reach-
ing consequences for all others and bring the en-
tire structure to collapse. In conflict management, 
it is therefore necessary to consider the interac-
tions of the individual parts. Only then can sus-
tainable solutions be developed. There are no pan-
aceas for this, but there are examples, experiences 
and experts (such as the UN envoy Lakhdar Bra-
himi) that could prove helpful for the negotiat-
ing partners. In this deadlock, Syria and the exter-
nal actors could learn from neighboring Lebanon, 
where a 16-year civil war (1975–1990) was ended 
with the compromise formula of “No victor, no 
vanquished.”
A proportional power-sharing agreement be-
tween ethnic/confessional communities, such as 
in Lebanon, is not a cure-all to overcome the so-
cial divide in communities of origin. In the me-
dium term, such a deal would threaten to solidi-
fy social fragmentation and make the state quar-
ry to patronage networks. Therefore, power shar-
ing can only serve as a tool of immediate crisis in-
tervention to ease communities’ fear of exclusion 
and extermination, to guarantee participation in 
power and to regulate political competition. A 
further step should be the establishment of in-
tegrative state institutions and the promotion of 
NGOs, which would promote interdenomination-
al cooperation and gradually restore confidence 
between the adversaries. With time, a more de-
veloped, more functional state should emerge – a 
state that treats its citizens as equals with the same 
rights and obligations (Rosiny 2013).
The war in Lebanon – in which numerous ex-
ternal actors meddled via proxies, much like in 
Syria today – was ended in 1989/1990. The majori-
ty of stakeholders, both internal and external, had 
come to the conclusion that the risk of continued 
war exceeded the benefits of an improbable victo-
ry. Given the huge losses of the Syrian war, it is 
to be hoped that the local, regional and global ac-
tors arrive as quickly as possible at the same real-
ization.
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